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Abstract—Attackers rapidly change their attacks to evade
detection. Even the most sophisticated Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems that are based on artificial intelligence and advanced
data analytic cannot keep pace with the rapid development of
new attacks. When standard detection mechanisms fail or do
not provide sufficient forensic information to investigate and
mitigate attacks, targeted threat hunting performed by competent
personnel is used. Unfortunately, many organization do not have
enough security analysts to perform threat hunting tasks and
today the level of automation of threat hunting is low.
In this paper we describe a framework for agile threat
hunting and forensic investigation (ATHAFI), which automates
the threat hunting process at multiple levels. Adaptive targeted
data collection, attack hypotheses generation, hypotheses testing,
and continuous threat intelligence feeds allow to perform simple
investigations in a fully automated manner. The increased level
of automation will significantly boost the analyst’s productivity
during investigation of the harshest cases.
Special Workflow Generation module adapts the threat hunt-
ing procedures either to the latest Threat Intelligence obtained
from external sources (e.g. National CERT) or to the likeli-
est attack hypotheses generated by the Hypotheses Generation
module. The combination of Attack Hypotheses Generation
and Workflows Generation enables intelligent adjustment of
workflows, which react to emerging threats effectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past years, the perpetrators of cyber-attacks play a
dynamic cat and mouse game with the defenders. Preventing
a particular kind of a cyber-attack does not mean the hackers
give up, but merely that they change their attack technique.
Attackers are constantly on the lookout for new victims, new
attack vectors, and new exploits. Current attack industry has
established methodologies of research, development, and exe-
cution of new attacks including attacks with the highest level
of sophistication, known as “Advanced Persistent Threats”
(APTs)1.
The most effective APT mitigation operations today include
routine investigations by security operation center (SOC) per-
sonnel, counter intelligence activities by national Computer
Emergency Response Teams (CERT), and threat hunting ini-
tiated due to security alerts or external threat intelligence.
Threat hunting is one of the most important security opera-
tions which includes active collection of forensic evidence in
order to discover advanced attacks that are evading existing
security solutions [1]. Current state of the art distinguishes
between two types of threat hunting: reactive [2]2 and proac-
1U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), https://csrc.
nist.gov/glossary/term/advanced-persistent-threat
2https://www.demisto.com/,https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/
products/investigator.html
tive [3, 4]. Proactive threat hunting relies on cyber threat
intelligence (CTI) [4–6] in order to formulate attack hypothe-
ses and actively search for potentially malicious behavior [7].
Reactive threat hunting involves forensic investigation and
attack hypothesis testing in response to alerts indicating po-
tentially malicious behavior [3]. Note that, in both cases, all
the information stored in the SIEM can be used in order
to better tailor the generated hypotheses to ongoing attacks.
According to SANS [7], 37.3% respondents who perform
threat hunting do so reactively, in response to suspicious
events. 60% of respondents perform proactive threat hunting
either continuously (43.2%) or at regular intervals (16.7%).
Threat hunting is performed by the most skillful security
analysts. The number of incidents that the security analysts
need to address is very high and there is a huge shortage of
security analysts in many countries and there is an urgent need
to develop new tools to improve the productivity to the existing
ones [8].
Automation during threat hunting helps reducing the time
and effort of the analyst, increasing the scale and efficiency of
hunts across the enterprise, and reducing the required analyst
qualification for performing certain types of investigations [7].
SIEM analytics, log file analysis, intrusion detection, and alike
are largely automated in all current environments. The next
level of automation is provided by Endpoint Detection and Re-
sponse (EDR) and Security Orchestration, Automation and Re-
sponse (SOAR) systems. EDR systems trigger adjustments of
policies, firewall rules, quarantine, etc., upon predefined alerts.
SOAR playbooks elaborate the response to alerts through
prescribed workflows that may include investigative steps,
response, and some of the hunting logic. Current playbooks
are manually prescribed by analysts based on their expert
knowledge and cyber threat intelligence (CTI) reports [9].
Lee&Lee [7] note that threat hunting cannot be fully auto-
mated because threats are moving targets. Indeed, a hunting
playbook coded a few months ago may become irrelevant
when hunting for the newest threats.
In this paper we present a framework for agile threat
hunting and forensic investigation (ATHAFI) addressing the
dynamic ever-changing threat landscape and the need for
continuous endless forensic investigation which adapts to
the current state of the organization and state of the art
threats. ATHAFI automatically finds support for vague clues
contained in collected sensor data based on descriptions of
past attacks, which we will further refer to as Indicators of
Attacks (IoAs) [10]. To accomplish this objective ATHAFI
reconfigures the sensors to collect data in a targeted manner.
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The proposed framework introduces two innovative compo-
nents that increase the level of automation during forensic
investigations and aid the security officers during strategic
decision making. The Attack Hypotheses Generation module
provides a set of tools, malware, and attack patterns that
are used by the attacker with the highest probability during
the investigated incident. The Workflow Generation module
provides the security officers with ready-to-execute distributed
threat hunting programs (termed “workflows”).
This research advances state-of-the-art threat hunting in the
following manner:
• ATHAFI framework automates large parts of the entire
threat hunting loop.
• ATHAFI framework is the first one to combine diverse
functionality such as analysis of high level CTI, hy-
potheses generation, attack hypotheses ranking, workflow
generation, and targeted data collection into one unified
semi-automated threat hunting process.
• ATHAFI defines a set of requirements and APIs for the
must-have functionality allowing flexible implementation
of the hunting loop.
• We provide an implementation show case which integrat-
ing multiple COTS products into the unified ATHAFI
framework.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, back-
ground on CTI is provided in Section II. Followed by related
work on threat hunting and threat hunting automation in
Section III. Section IV describes the components and processes
of the proposed ATHAFI framework, and Section V describes
an example implementation of ATHAFI’s functional shell.
Finally, Section VI summarizes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND: CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE
Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) is structured actionable
information for identifying adversaries, their motives, goals,
capabilities, resources, and tactics. CTI includes evidence-
based knowledge in the form of measurable events and the
context for their interpretation. CTI increases the ability of the
analyst to recognize relevant threats and respond to them in a
timely manner [4, 11]. CTI is a powerful mean to increase
efficiency of various security solutions, such as intrusion
detection, response, real time analytics, forensic investigation,
and threat hunting.
Since no organization possesses a complete understanding
of the threat landscape, the importance of CTI lies with
the ability to share threat information among partners in
a machine-to-machine manner. By sharing the who, what,
where, how, and when of malicious activities, targeted orga-
nizations obtain a holistic view of the threat landscape, thus
increasing their cyber security readiness [11].
According to a survey among various cyber security and IT
management roles presented by Shackleford [12], 48% of the
respondents say their use of CTI has reduced incidents through
early prevention, and 51% said they are able to respond more
quickly to incidents. Methods for CTI analysis can be applied
to provide SOC analysts with a list of related information,
supporting them in the decision making process while handling
cyber incidents [13].
In an effort to formalize a standard language for shar-
ing CTI, DHS Office of Cybersecurity and Communications
funded MITRE to develop the Structured Threat Information
eXpression (STIX) language3. STIX covers the entire range
of cyber security concepts, including observables, indicators
of compromise (IOC), attack patterns, tools, malware, threat
actors, course of action, and other. A STIX element is denoted
as STIX Domain Object (SDO). SDOs such as observable and
IOCs are considered low-level SDOs, while SDOs such as at-
tack patterns, tools and threat actors are considered high-level
SDOs. Additional CTI languages include Malware Information
Sharing Platform (MISP)4, as well as proprietary languages
and ontologies developed by McAfee [14] and IntelGraph by
Accenture [15].
CTI can be acquired by a victim organization who records
the attack investigation artifacts and shares them with peers.
Wheelus et al. [16] propose a tiered big data architecture for
the automation of capturing and handling of network traffic.
They generate features and artifacts that would be promptly
available for machine learning algorithms and anomaly detec-
tors. Samtani et al. [5] suggest collecting CTI proactively from
large international under ground hacker communities without
waiting for attacks to happen. They develop a framework
for storing and analyzing malicious assets such as crypters,
keyloggers, web, and database exploits collected from the dark
web.
III. RELATED WORK
Current paper proposes an automated threat hunting frame-
work based on CTI. Threat hunting is a domain actively
developed nowadays by cyber security industry, but receives
relatively little attention from academic research. Generally
speaking, threat hunting includes series of active investigative
steps that help confirming or refuting attack hypotheses. This
process may include forensic investigations and various analyt-
ics whose objective is inferring the attack steps and collecting
artifacts.
A. Threat Hunting
Cyber security experts are divided on the exact stages of the
threat hunting cycle and on its re-active or pro-active nature.
On one hand, some experts define threat hunting as proactively
looking for early indications of presumably ongoing attacks
without waiting for alerts to indicate suspicious activity [17].
On the other hand, threat hunting may refer to an investigative
process initiated in response to an alert. This process may
include advanced analytics, forensic investigations, targeted
data collection, or policy updating [3, 6]. The main dif-
ference between the proactive and reactive threat hunting
is the trigger for the investigation. Proactive threat hunting
relies on threat intelligence to actively search for potentially
3https://www.mitre.org/capabilities/cybersecurity/overview/
cybersecurity-blog/stix-20-finish-line
4https://www.misp-project.org/
malicious behavior. Reactive threat hunting involves forensic
investigation and attack hypothesis testing in response to alerts
indicating potentially malicious behavior. Figure 1 presents the
threat hunting cycle comprising both proactive and reactive
processes.
Fig. 1: Threat Hunting Cycle
Mavroeidis and Jøsang [18] present an ontological approach
for threat hunting using Sysmon logs in an automated manner.
The authors state the potential benefits of CTI in investigation
of attack events and anticipation of the next attack steps, how-
ever they do not present hypotheses generation, hypotheses
testing, and CTI generation. Similar to other works they rely
on predetermined data collection which is not affected by the
course of investigation.
The hypotheses testing phase is elaborated in [19], where it
is managed by the analyst. In order to increase the efficiency
of hypothesis testing, the authors propose τ -calculus to query
CTI and sensor data. Similar to most current cyber security
automation frameworks Shu et al. [19] focus on analysis of
the data contained in a central storage rather than performing
targeted data collection.
Thomas et al. [2] also focus on hypotheses testing, but
unlike Shu et al. [19] they allow the analyst to perform targeted
data collection. The investigation process is guided by the
analyst step by step relying on programmable software agents.
Security Orchestration, Automation and Response (SOAR)
systems go even further in automation of hypotheses test-
ing. These kind of systems perform autonomous response to
security alert or suspicious indicators relying on prescribed
workflows. A notable solution that allows targeted data col-
lection with high degree of automation was developed by
Demisto Inc. [20]. This product supports automation of threat
hunting and incident response by integrating disparate security
tools and maintaining a swarm of programmable software
agents. Prescribed investigation workflows, termed playbooks
in Demisto documentation, encode the steps of forensic in-
vestigations triggered by security events such as suspicious or
anomalous behavior detected by an IDS.
While Demisto playbooks automate targeted data collec-
tion for hypotheses testing, the playbooks themselves are
prescribed manually, according to best practices, and are not
derived from attack hypotheses or up-to-date CTI. Moreover,
Demisto assume that sophisticated investigations will be man-
ually orchestrated by an analyst because it is prohibitively hard
to automatically anticipate the attacker actions in a general
manner (generic algorithm that predicts attacker steps). In
contrast, ATHAFI utilizes specific CTI reports to automatically
generate investigation workflows which include investigative
steps suggested by the report. To partially mitigate the absence
of automated workflows generation Demisto implemented
decision support system where the analyst create custom
workflows relying on CTI and IntelliSense suggestions derived
from existing workflows.
A lot of effort is invested into seamless integration be-
tween machine and human analyst [3, 4, 7, 21]. A notable
product that provides human-machine teaming capabilities is
the McAfee Investigator [21]. This product can be regarded
as reactive threat hunting because it starts with choosing an
incident for detailed investigation. Advanced machine learning
algorithms choose the most relevant insights for the human
analysts who can then determine the risk and urgency of
the incident. After the analyst has chosen an incident for
detailed investigation the machinery uses human input to
gather relevant information and reports the summary back to
the analyst.
B. Threat Hunting Automation
Automated threat hunting should not be confused with
automated response, e.g. Endpoint Detection and Response
(EDR), which includes adjustments of policies, firewall rules,
quarantine, blacklisting, etc. Automated response rules are pre-
defined by the expert users and may be provided as the course
of action in CTI. In hunting, analysts come with new attack
hypotheses that need to be confirmed or refuted.
Experts agree that threat hunting cannot be fully auto-
mated [7, 21]. Intuition, creativity, and strategic thinking
applied by human analyst are essential to successful threat
hunting. In a SOC context, human intuition is required to
find new attack techniques, creativity helps investigating the
suspicious cases using available tools, and strategic thinking
helps the analyst to scope and assess the security events and
make accurate triage decisions.
Yet, diverse tools can be utilized to automate large parts
of the investigative process. First, investigations that were
already performed and scripted by the analyst can be au-
tomated to save future time in performing repetitive, time-
consuming tasks [3, 22, 23]. Demisto Inc. [24] provide their
clients with the ability to write playbooks (a.k.a workflows)
that encode the steps of forensic investigations. Furthermore,
recently Demisto and Siemplify [25] introduced intellisense
features, into their playbook writing kit, that recommend
arguments and parameters for various investigative tasks based
on recordings of past investigations. Having the pre-defined
playbooks, analysts manually trigger one or more playbooks
based on their understanding of current security situation and
suggestions presented by the systems.
There is a lack of mechanisms for automatic triggering of
workflow executions. The main reason for this gap is that
workflows may be resource intensive and their association
with specific alerts may not be trivial. To partially mitigate
this gap threat hunting automation includes advanced analyt-
ics [26, 27], data visualization in an actionable form [20, 21],
human machine teaming [21, 28], etc.
After the analyst has chosen an incident for detailed inves-
tigation the machinery uses human input to gather relevant in-
formation and reports the summary back to the analyst [2, 21].
Common threat hunting dashboards strive to present the ana-
lyst high level insights and attack hypotheses rather than alerts
and IOCs in order to better manage the analyst’s cognitive
load [21, 29]. When presented the right information at the
right time an analyst can make accurate triage decisions faster
and deep dive into the most significant threats.
The most sophisticated solutions utilize interactive guide-
books to help the analysts focus on what is important as they
scope and assess the attack hypotheses. The next generation
of threat hunting automation will include fully automated
investigations of the simplest attack hypotheses. Current state
of the art response automation may be turned into a primitive
variant of such automatic investigations. For example, Thomas
et al. [2] disclose a system where the first investigative action
can be triggered automatically by an alert. These automated
investigations may be significantly expanded by utilizing CTI.
Although, automated hunting of the most sophisticated threats
is too futuristic, the framework proposed in this paper fully
automates simple investigations allowing the analyst to focus
on the most sophisticated cases.
IV. THE ATHAFI FRAMEWORK
In this section we describe the main components and
processes of the proposed Agile Threat Hunting and Forensic
Investigation (ATHAFI) framework as depicted in Figure 2.
Fig. 2: ATHAFI high-level architecture
ATHAFI operates a network of re-programmable agents,
able to adapt their behavior to the emerging threats. The
behavior of the agents is controlled by ready-to-execute dis-
tributed threat hunting programs (termed “workflows”).
The purpose of these workflows is targeted collection of
forensic artifacts in order to confirm or refute an attack
hypothesis and track down the attack-path.
The command and control unit (C&C), operated by the
security analysts, is responsible for managing the workflows.
In order to execute a workflow, the C&C pulls it from the
workflows database and starts a workflow execution con-
tainer for each executed workflow. The C&C is responsible
for: storing predefined workflows, maintaining metadata about
workflows in progress, receiving notifications from the work-
flow containers about workflows’ completion of investigation
and the existence of forensic findings in the Security Infor-
mation and Event Management (SIEM) subsystem.
ATHAFI supports both workflows hand-crafted by a security
analyst and workflows automatically generated by the Work-
flows Generation (WG) module. In order to generate the
workflows, WG relies on Indicators of Attacks (IoAs) provided
either from external CTI feeds or generated by the Attack
Hypotheses Generation (AHG) module. All IoAs are stored
in the CTI Knowledge Database (AttackDB). Note, that
some of the IoAs stored in the AttackDB are temporary attack
hypotheses, i.e. IoAs of presumably ongoing attacks, relevant
only during the course of an investigation. Since it is not
feasible to execute workflows for every IoA in the AttackDB,
a Ranker module is used to narrow down the searching space
for the WG module. The Ranker also produces a list of IoAs
that are most likely to be taking place according to the forensic
findings stored in the SIEM.
ATHAFI framework facilitates the entire threat hunting
loop, as depicted in Figure 1. Re-programmable agents, AHG,
Ranker, workflows and WG are the functional core of ATHAFI
centered around the AttackDB which stores IoAs provided by
CTI feeds. CTI stored in AttackDB is used for attack hypothe-
ses generation by the AHG module. The AHG module allows
advanced analysis and correlation between high-level and low-
level SDOs. Sound hypotheses are fed back into AttackDB for
further validation by the hypotheses testing workflows. Hand-
crafted workflows or workflows generated automatically by the
WG module test whether or not the organization suffers from
one of the attacks described in the AttackDB. Response is also
facilitated by workflows that encode the required course of
action. ATHAFI orchestrates commercial of the shelf (COTS)
systems for intrusion detection and response.
Flexible design of ATHAFI allows both proactive and reac-
tive threat hunting. In the reactive modus operandi, detection
of an anomaly is followed by generating actionable attack
hypotheses and acting to confirm or refute them using the
AHG and WG modules, respectively. In the proactive modus
operandi, both AHG and WG modules act without being
triggered by an external event.
ATHAFI framework facilitates three levels of automation.
1) Reasoning – The first level of automation is facilitated
by the AHG module where the descriptions of hypothet-
ical attacks (i.e. IoAs) are generated based on collected
evidence and CTI.
2) Targeted evidence acquisition – ATHAFI’s workflows
automate the forensic investigation process including
Fig. 3: AttackDB schema aligned along the Pyramid of Pain
targeted data collection. This is similar to the automation
level provided by common Security Orchestration, Au-
tomation and Response (SOAR) systems (e.g. Demisto’s
playbooks).
3) Closing the loop – The last level of automation is
facilitated by the WG module that can create workflows
from IoAs.
A. AttackDB Schema
AttackDB is a central ATHAFI component around which
all other modules are revolving. The primary objective of
AttackDB is encapsulating the knowledge from various CTI
sources. This knowledge is used by all other modules to
perform their tasks.
AttackDB contains SDOs at all levels of the pyramid of
pain (PoP) [30] from the abstract concepts such as tactics
and techniques at the top levels down to IOCs and specific
observables such as hashes, IPs, and domain names. Reasoning
on the higher levels of the PoP is challenging and is facilitated
by the AHG module.
Figure 3 depicts the schematic structure of AttackDB. The
top level SDOs in AttackDB are attack patterns (a.k.a. tactics
and techniques). These SDOs stand for the malicious activities
exhibited by Malware, Campaign or Intrusion Set. Malware is
a software that exhibits a set of malicious activities. Malware
can be a part of multiple Campaigns. Campaign represents a
set of malicious activities at a specific period of time against
specific targets. Campaigns that are believed to be orchestrated
by the same Threat Actor may be grouped into Intrusion
Sets. Despite the semantic differences between them, Malware,
Campaign, and Intrusion Set SDOs can be used to represent
an attack being hunted down.
Further AttackDB contains observed data associated with
each attack as reported by then CTI. Observed data contains
hashes, IP addresses, domains, and network and host artifacts
(i.e., telemetry) such as process names, services, registry keys,
etc. Observed data (usually hashes of malicious files or IP
addresses) may be grouped together in a pattern and tagged
as an IOC. IOCs can be used to identify attacks observed
in the past but are usually easily modified by the attacker. All
the observed data stored in AttackDB is processed and used to
create attack hypotheses, rank them, and generate workflows.
B. Agents
ATHAFI includes software agents installed on PCs and
servers across the organization. As a general design considera-
tion we prefer using COTS tools developed by market leaders
rather than developing tailor-made software in-house for every
function which is not the innovation core of the proposed
framework. Specifically, in this research we rely on existing
well known (software) agents’ infrastructures provided by
McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator (McAfee ePO).
The agents are instructed by workflows to collect data (i.e.
observables) which is relevant to selected attacks (or attack
hypotheses) according to the AttackDB. Collected data is
partially processed by the agents in place and the results
are transferred to a central repository for deeper analysis.
Common SIEM products which provide big-data management
capabilities as well as a set of correlation, aggregation, and
analysis rules can be used. The result of the analysis of
collected forensic information includes alerts on suspected
attacks.
C. Attack Hypotheses Generator
The Attack Hypotheses Generator (AHG) generates IoAs
of hypothetical attacks (hypotheses) based on known attacks
given in the AttackDB and the current state of the system, as
represented by forensic evidence collected by the agents and
stored in the SIEM. We refer to an attack hypothesis as a set
of SDOs that together describe one complete attack scenario
(i.e. Campaign). While reasoning about attack hypotheses we
take into account low level data such as observables and IOCs
as well as high level information contained in CTI such as
campaigns, tools, malware, attack patterns, etc. In the rest of
this paper we will refer to tools, malware, and attack patterns
collectively as high-level SDOs.
1) Sighting of high-level SDO: The STIX term sighting
denotes the belief that something related to an attack was
seen. Usually only observables and IOCs, such as registry keys
and file hashes, are sighted. In some cases tools and malware
are sighted as well, when the analyst finds the respective
software in the compromised system. In addition, observables
collected by various sensors and IDSs may lead the analyst
to a conclusion that a certain tool, malware, or attack pattern
was used by the attacker. In the following discussions we will
use the term sighting to indicate that sufficient evidence was
found that a tool, a malware, or an attack pattern was used by
the attacker.
2) What a good hypothesis is?: A good attack hypothesis
should describe a complete attack scenario starting from the
initial penetration throughout the cyber kill chain up until the
current state of the attack or even the final goal.
a) Represent a viable attack: A good hypothesis should
represent a complete attack sequence including if possible
initial penetration, lateral movement, persistence, command
and control, information collection activities, etc. (see BAD-
NEWS IoA example in Figure 4). It is important to include
coherent SDOs within a hypotheses such as activities most of
which are common to the same threat actor. An incident report
with a detailed description of an attack campaign may serve
as an attack hypothesis. In fact attacks witnessed by other
organizations with similar crown jewels are used as attack
hypotheses in proactive threat hunting [31].
b) Contain actionable insights: The most important ac-
tionable part of a hypothesis is the set of low-level SDOs
(IOCs and observables) and high-level SDOs (tools, malware,
and attack patterns) that were not sighted yet. The hypothetic
tools, malware, and attack patterns that the threat actor might
have been using as a part of the investigated campaign
should be linked to relevant forensic information in order to
provide the analyst with directions for further investigation and
facilitate automated testing later on. It is important to include
diverse observables which can be partially matched and not
only file hashes.
c) Being supported by data: Assume two different attack
hypotheses, one presumably attributed to Group A and the
other one to Group B. The former hypothesis has some support
within the data stored in SIEM while the latter does not.
Having all other parameters equal, which hypothesis should
be investigated first? Probably the one with some support.
3) Hypothesis generation: The input to the AHG are the
IOCs identified so far and stored in the SIEM and a knowledge
base composed from structured descriptions of past campaigns.
AHG algorithms infer the possible high-level SDOs related
to the collected IOCs. Then, AHG performs higher level
reasoning about yet unnoticed tools, malware, and attack
patterns and their related IOCs. Finally, AHG outputs sets of
SDOs (including IOCs) as attack hypotheses.
Attack hypotheses generation may be modeled for example
as a plan recognition problem or a recommendation system.
In the former case, the AttackDB is the complete attack-
graph [32] of an organization with exploits and attack patterns
modeled as actions with pre- and post-conditions. Given partial
observations of the actions the solver reconstructs the full
attack path to either one of the possible attack goals [33]. In
the latter case, the AttackDB contains a cyber ontology, such
as ATT&CK [34], linking past incidents to low- and high-level
SDOs. Relying on this ontology, recommender algorithms
produce an ordered list of SDOs that are affiliated with a given
set of observed SDOs [? ].
Following the automated generation of attack hypotheses
it is also important to allow the security analyst to inspect
and augment the hypotheses. An automatically generated
hypothesis is the first level of automation (i.e Reasoning) sup-
porting the decision making of the analyst and inspiring new
investigation directions. However, the experience, creativity,
and strategic thinking of a human analyst are important for
successful threat hunting.
D. Ranker
The hypotheses generated by the AHG module need to be
prioritized. The Ranker helps in digital triaging by prioritizing
hypotheses according to their likelihood given the information
available in the SIEM.
A naı¨ve implementation of the Ranker module can rely on
the Jaccard distance between the IOCs listed in the hypothesis
and the observables collected by the sensors. Advanced rankers
such as DTDFPM [35], employ artificial neural networks to
prioritize the investigations. Another notable example of an
intelligent hypotheses ranker is the McAfee’s Investigator [21].
E. Hypotheses Testing Workflows
Once an attack hypothesis has been proposed it should
be tested. The purpose of hypothesis testing workflows is
collecting forensic data, in order to complete the missing
information and support or refute the hypothesis. This is
the second level of automation of the threat hunting process
that reduces the human effort involved in targeted evidence
acquisition.
Hypothesis can be confirmed by a workflow if it finds suffi-
cient evidence that the attack described by the hypothesis takes
place. In such a case the Ranker module (see Section IV-D)
will rank the hypothesis higher than alternatives.
It is harder to refute a hypothesis than to confirm one
because the fact that we did not find sufficient evidence does
not mean the respective malicious activity does not take place.
Nevertheless, the rank of a hypothesis can be lowered if
specific relevant evidence was searched for but not found.
Workflow is a distributed algorithm that encodes the evi-
dences acquisition logic and defines the specific investigative
steps. Such workflows include multiple tasks that need to be
executed by the agents, depending on the threat in question.
Since workflows are (distributed) programs they also include
control operators such as loops and decision points. Given
a workflow, it may be important to distribute the tasks to
different agents in order to optimize time efficiency, or bal-
anced CPU consumption, network traffic consumption, and
other resources. Agents may execute the various workflows in
parallel, serially, or at a specific time or context as determined
by the workflow execution plan.
Different scripting languages, such as Python or Java, can be
used to implement workflows. Since workflows are automati-
cally generated based on data (attack models and indicators)
imported from external sources, they cannot be trusted. It is
important to run automatically generated workflows within a
secured container, such as RestrictedPython, in order to reduce
the risk of exploits provided in form of IOCs or other CTI
elements.
Workflows contain three main types of instructions: policies,
tasks and alerts. A policy is a set of rules and sub-rules that are
part of an Intrusion Prevention System (IPS). Policies monitor
only activities that take place after the policies’ deployment.
Policies can be assigned to one or more hosts using the agents
installed at every host.
Fig. 4: BADNEWS malware (red) with its direct relationships to techniques / attack patterns (purple) and an intrusion-set
(green). Techniques are connected to tactics (yellow). The set of depicted techniques are considered an IoA for BADNEWS.
A task is an executable which is deployed upon demand
and is being executed on chosen hosts in a scheduled manner.
Tasks are used to search for forensic artifacts, i.e., evidences
to activities that took place in the past.
Alerts and alert handlers are search queries that are gen-
erated to search in the SIEM for the data that the policies
and tasks collect. Alerts are being executed automatically in
a scheduled manner in the SIEM. Whenever a search query
returns non empty results an alert handler receives these results
and automatically activates the next step of the investigation as
encoded in the workflow. Namely, alert handlers are callback
functions responsible for the automated transition from one
stage of the investigation to the other.
F. Workflow Generator
Workflows can be hand-crafted on a case-by-case manner
by a security analyst, based on relevant up-to-date CTI. Since
such workflows are tailored to specific investigated attacks, the
sophistication level required from an analyst to write them is
relatively low. However, the large number of descriptions of
potential attacks makes this approach infeasible.
Workflows can also represent generic investigation pro-
cedures suitable for large classes of attacks similar to the
approach taken by Demisto [24]. Such workflows need to be
developed by skillful personnel. Generic workflows may be
too complex to handle efficiently and may include superfluous
actions that are not required for an investigation of the specific
threat being confronted. In addition, even the most generic
and sophisticated workflows may become obsolete when new
techniques and procedures are introduced to the cyber-warfare.
In order to benefit from the specificity and timeliness of
case-by-case workflows and reduce the human effort, WG
(Workflow Generation) module closes the loop by providing
the third level of automation, where good hypotheses testing
workflows are automatically generated based on latest CTI.
1) What a good workflow is?: A good hypothesis testing
workflow should, on one hand, collect all the information
related to the investigated threat, and on the other hand,
perform it in an efficient manner without interfering with the
operation of the organization.
a) Resources: A good hypotheses testing workflow
should not consume the resources of the operation critical end
hosts and servers up to the level where it is noticeable by
the users. The workflow should mind the CPU and memory
consumption of the investigative tasks performed during the
hunting. It should also consider the computational resources
required to perform the analysis on the equipment dedicated
for the cyber security operations.
b) Accuracy: A good workflow should find all artifacts
generated by the attacker. The amount of irrelevant informa-
tion collected by the workflow and presented to the analyst
should be minimized. The investigative steps performed by
a workflow should be sufficient for the Ranker to give the
highest rank to the hypothesis that best describes the ongoing
attack.
c) Timeliness: A good workflow should refute or confirm
as many hypotheses as possible as fast as possible.
2) Design considerations:
a) IOC robustness vs. indicativeness: IOCs are observ-
ables that are indicative enough to identify malicious activity.
Liao et al. [36] define robustness of IOCs as the percentage of
IOCs that remain unchanged in a set of reported campaigns.
Most IOCs at the bottom of the PoP, such as hash values, IP
addresses, domain names, and network/host artifacts, are not
robust. These indicators are easily modified by the attacker,
for example, an attacker may change IP addresses and file
hashes with minimal effort.5 Even domain names can easily
5The attacker may use anonymous proxy service like Tor in order to change
the IP, while a file’s hash is changed by flipping a bit in an unused resource
or adding spaces.
be changed due to the free DNS providers and lax registration
standards. As a consequence, using only IOCs from the bottom
of the PoP to search for a malicious activity within an
environment results in high precision and low recall.
Some observables may be used to alert about a suspicious
activity within the system but they cannot be considered a
strong indication of a compromise. Such alerts are more robust
matching a larger number of incidents but their precision is
low due to non negligible false positive rate. Alert correlation
and filtering techniques [26, 27, 37] are commonly used to
reduce the false positive rate eventually resulting in detectors
with a good trade-off between precision and recall.
Similarly, correlation between a number of robust observ-
ables, each one of which is not indicative enough to identify a
compromise, may be sufficient to support an attack hypothesis.
b) CTI based automation: While investigating an inci-
dent the analyst provides inputs to the machinery that allow
gathering relevant information in order to report the summary
back to the human [2, 21]. One way to reduce the involvement
of a human analyst on early stages of the hypothesis testing
process is by relying on CTI. A WG module should automat-
ically infer from the CTI and the artifacts found so far, which
information need to be collected if and when an alert is raised.
This information is used to perform the next investigative step.
Although, a human analyst must curate the automatic in-
vestigation process, his involvement can be gradually reduced
using intelligent workflow generation. This will allow the
analyst to focus on strategic aspects of the investigation pro-
cess rather than instructing the machinery which information
should be collected in response to each alert. The workflows
generated based on the CTI should eventually collect and
provide the analyst all artifacts relevant to the performed
investigation. This process may be long and contain multiple
steps and branches depending on the intermediate results of
the automated investigation.
The WG algorithms should generate workflows that perform
fully automated investigations of simple attack hypotheses.
c) Performance optimization: Consider three kinds of
monitoring and data collection activities: real-time measure-
ments, on access monitoring, and forensic data collection.
On-access monitoring is a kind of real-time monitoring
where the IDS scans a resource, e.g. file or registry key,
when this resource is used. Usually this kind of monitoring
is implemented by hooking the system at the lowest levels.
Since the scan is performed only when the resource is accessed
and the check vs. the IOC lists is very fast, such method is
considered to be least resource intensive. The downside of
on-access monitoring is the inability to find IOCs generated
before the beginning of the monitoring process.
Real-time measurements typically include various perfor-
mance metrics such as CPU, memory, I/O, network measure-
ments of sorts, etc. For example, anomaly detection algorithms
employed by IDS may use these measurements to detect
anomalous behavior of hosts and processes [38, 39]. The
resources consumed by the real-time monitors themselves
mostly depend on the sampling rate and the method used to
collect the data.
Forensic data collection is the most resource intensive kind
of data collection activity. For example, in order to find
whether or not a file exists on the system, we need to scan
the hard-drive (or the file index if it exists). We include
under this category the most advanced analytics and forensic
investigation tools such as EnCase6 and Volatility7.
In order to save the computational resources the generated
workflows should employ on-access monitoring and real time
measurements (with low sampling) while looking for the first
leads. When a lead is found the more resource intensive
monitoring can be performed in a targeted manner to find the
most indicative artifacts, either forensic or real-time. Note that
ATHAFI also collects performance measurements related to
the activities of its own workflows in order to avoid interfering
with the operation of the organization.
G. ATHAFI for Managed Security Service Providers (MSSP)
Organization experience increasing difficulties in hiring
and maintaining skillful cyber security experts. To address
the skills gap, many organizations turn to managed secu-
rity service providers (MSSPs) for outside security help [8].
ATHAFI framework, as described so far, is designed for a
single location deployment framework. However, with minor
modifications to the architecture, ATHAFI framework can be
used by MSSPs (see Figure 5). In such a case, the global
components at ATHAFI’s data center include the AttackDB,
the workflows’ database, global SIEM, global C&C, and the
AHG, WG and Ranker modules. The client’s on-premises
components include a local SIEM that stores data and sends
in batches to the global SIEM, a workflow container managed
by the global C&C, and the agents’ infrastructure for data
collection and incidence response.
Fig. 5: ATHAFI high-level architecture for MSSP
V. EXAMPLE IMPLEMENTATION AND DEPLOYMENT
In this section we highlight the implementation caveats of
the ATHAFI functional core as well as the functional shell
modules that support it.
6https://www.guidancesoftware.com/encase-forensic
7https://www.volatilityfoundation.org/
A. Building the AttackDB
In current ATHAFI implementation, AttackDB knowledge
graph is stored in a Neo4j database. Any graph database
may used for this purpose. We constructed a rich AttackDB
that is combined of CTI from MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise
knowledge base8, Alien Vault Open Threat Exchange9, and
Virus Total10.
MITRE’s ATT&CK is a CTI open knowledge base that
contains information on threat adversarial techniques and
tactics, threat actors, mitigation, malware, and tools [34]. First
we populate the AttackDB with malware, techniques, and the
relationships between them extracted from MITRE ATT&CK.
AlienVault OTX contains CTI in the form of pulses, which
contain one or more IOCs, such as file hashes, URLs, IPs.
Pulses can be tagged with malware names, threat actors, and
additional information. As a second step, we search for pulses
using malware names via OTX API and link malware nodes
in the AttackDB to IOCs from the respective pulses. The most
important IOCs required for the last, third, step of populating
the AttackDB are hashes. In current implementation we do
not consider the MITRE ATT&CK IDs specified in AlienVault
pulses.
AlienVault allows anyone to post a set of IOCs as a pulse,
which causes a reliability problem. Therefore, we used pulses
uploaded by the top 20 publishers with the most subscriptions
who posted pulses related to the searched malware: AlienVault,
MalwarePatrol, jnazario, niddel, Metadefender, cyberprotect,
popularmalware, Malwaremustdie, Cyber Hat, burberry, bart-
blaze, ESET-Spain, julsec, zer0daydan, rpsanch, erik, milind,
BLUELIV, techhelplist, BotnetExposer, and nightingale.
To further enrich the AttackDB with various network and
host artifacts observed in relation to each of the malware.
For this purpose, in the third step, we retrieved behavioral
analysis data from VirusTotal for all hashes obtained from
AlienVault. The observed behavioral data retrieved from Virus-
Total includes file names (opened, created, searched, etc.),
URLs, domains, IPs, process names, registry keys, mutexes,
and emails, and more.
The resulting AttackDB contains 214 malware nodes asso-
ciated with IOCs, 93 malware nodes not associated with IOCs.
Figure 6 depicts an example of the AttackDB containing
two malware nodes and all the relevant connections. At the
top level we see malware and associated techniques extracted
from MITRE ATT&CK. The three respective IOCs (two hash
values and one URL) are extracted from AlienVault. Following
STIX format the relevant Observed Data nodes are tagged
with IOCs that indicate the relevant malware. Finally, the
behavioral data extracted from VirusTotal is displayed in the
bottom of the figure. This observed data is not tagged with
IOC nodes because these are not known as strong indications
of the attack, but are merely artifacts generated by the malware
during dynamic analysis.
8https://github.com/swimlane/pyattck
9https://otx.alienvault.com/dashboard/new
10https://www.virustotal.com/gui/home/search
Fig. 6: An illustration of the AttackDB structure
Note that a behavioral artifact may be connected to a
malware through multiple paths. This happens when there
are multiple instances of the same malware analyzed by
VirusTotal. Furthermore, note that observables are indirectly
connected to techniques, through the respective malware. The
more paths are there from an observable to a technique the
higher is the affinity between them. We will use this heuristic
to build attack hypotheses in Section ??.
B. Commercial of-the-shelf components
As a general design consideration of ATHAFI we prefer
using existing tools and frameworks developed by market
leaders rather than developing tailor-made in-house software
for software agents’ management, data collection infrastruc-
ture, and security information and event management (SIEM).
Specifically, in this research we rely on McAfee ePolicy
Orchestrator (McAfee ePO) as the agents’ infrastructure and
Splunk Enterprise as the SIEM. McAfee ePO provides soft-
ware agents resilient to anti-forensic malware, optimized per-
formance, set of monitoring tools, etc. We chose ePO due
to (1) its support of dynamic deployment of tasks on the
software agents, (2) its support of deployment of specific tasks
on specific agents, (3) its support of deployment of customized
tasks on the agents, (4) its supply of variety of products to
employ as tasks, and (5) the built-in security assurance.
Splunk Enterprise provides big-data management capabili-
ties as well as a set of correlation, aggregation, and analysis
rules. In ATHAFI, Splunk SIEM is responsible for receiving
data created by tasks and collected according to policies
executed by the ePO agents on the hosts. Data generated as a
result of McAfee’s tasks and policies is first sent to the ePO
server. Then Splunk collects the data from the ePO server.
In addition, Splunk provides (1) an API for the automatic
execution of search queries over the collected data, (2) an
API for the automatic definition of rules that will alert upon
a specific accumulation of data (and delegation of the alert
notifications to the alert handlers).
C. Workflow Execution Container (WF-Container)
The C&C starts a separate process of WF-Container for each
workflow that should be executed. The WF-Container receives
from the C&C a workflow and is responsible for: (1) executing
the workflow in a secure mode (RestrictedPython mode); (2)
linking the workflow commands with the ePO and Splunk
servers; and (3) returning the workflow’s final execution status
to the C&C.
The WF-Container prevents the workflow from directly
accessing the C&C and the APIs provided by the ePO and
Splunk software. Instead it wraps the direct access to C&C,
ePO and Splunk using the following components (see Figure 7
for illustration):
1) cnc api responsible for the communication with the
C&C.
2) epo api responsible for the communication with the
ePO server.
3) splunk api and splunk listener responsible for the com-
munication with the Splunk server.
These components provide the following ’building blocks’
for a workflow: running tasks and activating policies at specific
hosts, defining rules for the Splunk to launch (alerts), defining
handlers to alerts.
VI. SUMMARY
Threat hunting is one of the most important security op-
erations for mitigating cyber threats in the ever expanding
cyber threat landscape. Unfortunately, many organizations
do not have enough competent security analysts to perform
threat hunting tasks. Automation during threat hunting helps
reducing the time and effort of the analyst, increasing the scale
and efficiency of hunts across the enterprise, and reducing the
required analyst qualification for performing certain types of
investigations. However, there is much automation to add in
the reactive and proactive threat hunting cycle in order to sig-
nificantly boost the analyst’s productivity during investigation
of the harshest cases.
In this paper we presented a framework for agile threat
hunting and forensic investigation (ATHAFI) that adapts to
the current state of the organization and state of the art threats
and addresses the need for continuous forensic investigation.
This is achieved by combining high level CTI, hypotheses
generation, attack hypotheses ranking, workflow generation,
and targeted data collection into one unified semi-automated
threat hunting process.
The proposed AttackDB schema encapsulates CTI from
various sources to be used by the other modules. The Workflow
Generation (WG) module adapts the threat hunting procedures
either to the latest CTI or to the likeliest attack hypotheses gen-
erated by the Attack Hypotheses Generation (AHG) module.
Thus, the AHG and the WG modules facilitate not only the
identification of threat activities based on the IoAs, but also
the generation of new attack hypothesis and their automatic
validation.
We define a set of requirements and APIs for the must-have
functionality allowing flexible implementation of the hunting
loop. Finally, we provide an implementation show case which
integrating multiple COTS products into the unified ATHAFI
framework.
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